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When Religion Becomes a
Nuisance: Balancing Land Use
and Religious Freedom When
Activities of Religious
Institutions Bring Outsiders
into the Neighborhood
BY SHELLEY Ross SAXER*
If a person is righteous and does what is lawful and right... and gives
his bread to the hungry and covers the naked with a garment... he is
righteous, he shall surely live, says the Lord God.'
INTRODUCTION
P roponents have hailed zoning as an effective use of the state's
delegated police power to regulate for the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of local communities.' Land use legislation "allo-
cates land uses throughout the community to prevent conflicts between
incompatible uses that might otherwise locate adjacent to each other."3
Zoning not only segregates incompatible uses to avoid nuisance conflicts,
it also preserves property values4 and promotes social values by "lay[ing]
* Assistant Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.S.
1980, Pepperdine University; J.D. 1989, University of California at Los Angeles.
The author thanks colleague, Rick Cupp, for his helpful comments and research
assistants, Laurie Stone and Stuart Talley, for their skillful research and editing
assistance.
' Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538, 544 n.3 (D.D.C. 1994) (quoting Ezekiel 18:5-9), appeal dismissed,
Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL 118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
2 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.32, at 53 (3d ed. 1993)
(explaining that the purpose of land use regulation is to "advance legitimate
governmental interests that serve the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare").
3 Id. § 2.05, at 22.
4 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.02, at 689-90
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out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."5 In the
landmark zoning decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of comprehen-
sive and restrictive zoning7 used to protect residential areas from
nonresidential uses. The Court supported its decision by reference to
nuisance law which bases the acceptability of land use on "the circum-
stances and the locality,"' not necessarily the use itself.
Religious land uses, although nonresidential in nature, have typically
been located in residential areas. Such residential locations have been
justified by the need to locate religious uses close to the people they
serve - that is, generally within walking distance of homes.9 Religious
institutions have also enjoyed special treatment when legislative land use
restrictions are applied to religious activities.'" This special status has
been conferred because of the religious institutions' unique contribution
to the public welfare and because of the First Amendment's Free Exercise
(3d ed. 1986) (citing Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 3 (1926) (stating that local
zoning regulations shall be made "with a view to conserving the value of
buildings")).
' Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (citing Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26(1954)).
6 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
' MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 2.17, at 34.
8 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
9 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.21, at 539-40
(3d ed. 1986).
0 Grace Community Church v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 615 A.2d
1092, 1102-03 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.22
and following the majority rule that churches may not be completely excluded
from residential zones but may be subject to reasonable regulation); Family
Christian Fellowship v. County of Winnebago, 503 N.E.2d 367, 371 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (holding that a strong presumption in favor of the validity of zoning
restrictions is diminished when the impact limits free exercise of religion),
appeal denied, 511 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. 1987); Lakewood Residents Ass'n v.
Congregation Zichron Schneur, 570 A.2d 1032, 1035 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1989) ("[C]ourts have held that religious activity itself is in furtherance of
public morals and the general welfare, and that religious institutions enjoy a
highly-favored and protected status, which severely curtails the permissible
extent of governmental regulation in this area."); State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist
Church v. Village Bd. of Trustees, 108 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Wis. 1961) (explaining
that a majority of courts hold that exclusion of churches by zoning is unconstitu-
tional).
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Clause." Nevertheless, religious uses in residential neighborhoods can
create a multitude of land use conflicts due to increased traffic, noise, and
litter; an increased tax burden to neighbors due to the religious use
exemption from taxes; and the influx of people from outside the local
residential community. When religious uses serve people from outside the
local community, 2 one of the reasons for favoring religious land use -
accessible and convenient service to the religious organization's members
- disappears. Because of these anticipated conflicts, communities may be
hesitant to welcome new religious uses into their neighborhoods.
However, First Amendment constitutional concerns require that local
government zoning actions be subject to closer scrutiny than legislative
actions involving secular uses.'3 Therefore, "judicial zoning" through
" ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.21, at 538; see also Congregation Dovid
Ben Nuchim v. City of Oak Park, 199 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that "use of land for a church is recognized as bearing a real,
substantial, and beneficial relationship to the public health, safety, and general
welfare so as to be accordeda preferred status"); Lakewood Residents Ass 'n, 570
A.2d at 1035 ("[C]ourts have held that religious activity is itself in furtherance
of public morals and general welfare and that religious institutions enjoy a
highly-favored and protected status.").
2 Covenant Community Church, Inc. v. Town of Gates Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 444 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) ("[T]he traditional
small church serving the immediate neighborhood [is] evolving into the more
modem church which tends to attract communicants from afar." (quoting Jewish
Reconstructionist Synagogue, Inc. v. IncorporatedVillage, 342 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976))).
"3 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[O]nly those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion."); Islamic Ctr., Inc. v. City of Starkville,
840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1988) ("When a zoning ordinance burdens religious
use, 'the deference normally due a legislative zoning judgment is not merited."'
(quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122 (1982))); Western
Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544
(D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that laws may not "substantially burden" the free
exercise of religion), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104,94-7189, 1995 WL 118016
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995); Douglas Laycock& Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 222 (1994) (zoning
officials in the District of Columbia "seeking to shut down a church breakfast
program for the homeless initially asserted that they had a compelling interest in
socio-economic apartheid - in excluding the homeless from affluent neighbor-
hoods").
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nuisance concepts may be the appropriate way for neighborhoods to
control the use of land by religious institutions in their community. 4
This Article examines the escalating conflict between homeowners
and religious institutions when a religious use located inside a residential
community serves people from outside the community." Current
14 Western Presbyterian Church, 862 F. Supp. at 546 (holding that church may
provide feeding program for homeless so long as it does not constitute a nuisance);
Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071, 1080 (La. 1985) (holding that restrictions
imposed on defendant's Christmas display placed reasonable restrictions on size so as
not to create a nuisance, but still gave deference to the constitutional right to express
religious beliefs), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986).
"5 Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church,
550 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (involving neighbors who insisted on
preparation of Environmental Impact Statement prior to operation of homeless
shelter); American Friends of the Soc'y of St Pius, Inc. v. Schwab, 417 N.Y.S.2d
991, 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), appeal denied, 401 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1980).
Human experience teaches us that public officials, when faced with pressure
to bar church uses by those residing in a residential neighborhood, tend to
avoid any appearance of an antireligious stance and temper their decision by
carefully couching their grounds for refusal to permit such use in terms of
traffic dangers, fire hazards and noise and disturbance, rather than on such
crasser grounds as lessening of property values or loss of open space or
entry of strangers into the neighborhood or undue crowding of the area.
Id.; Marsden v. Board of Zoning Appeals, No. 01-A-01-9012-CH-00455, 1991
Tenn. App. LEXIS 326, at *6 (1991) (recognizing "the natural and understandable
dismay with which some of the close neighbors view the demolition of residences in
their vicinity to be replaced by a large place of meeting for numerous individuals
from outside the immediate vicinity'); Robert E. Pierre, Bill Would Limit Houses of
Worship in ResidentialAreas, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1993, at MI (involving county
council consideration of a bill that would make it more difficult for religious
institutions to locate in residential neighborhoods, in response to residents' complaints
about resultant noise and parking problems); Otto Strong, Familiar Issues in District
19 Primary: Noise, Youths Top Concerns, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 1993, at 31, 31
(explaining that where religious groups have renovated or used houses for their
activities, "[t]he community gets upset because it brings in traffic"); Elizabeth Wiener,
Nonresidential Use of "Gold Coast" Homes Prompts Zoning Battle, WASH. POST,
May 21, 1992, at J1 (discussing complaints by civic leaders that church houses are
diminishing the sense of community by "bringing in more cars, outsiders, noise, trash
and Sunday parking problems"); Larry Witham, Churches Find Growing Friction
Dealing with Local Governments, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at A3 ("[H]ouses of
worship ... [are] increasingly at odds with zoning laws, tax-conscious governments
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controversial uses addressed in this Article include drug counseling
centers ran by religious groups1 6 and the feeding and sheltering of the
homeless. 7 Part I discusses what constitutes a religious use or accessory
use"8 for purposes of applying zoning ordinances and actions to such
uses. Part II examines how current constitutional analysis under the Free
Exercise Clause affects zoning decisions that burden religious freedom
and includes a discussion of the newly enacted Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").2" Part III observes the role that
nuisance litigation should play in resolving conflicts between land use
restrictions and religious uses.2' The Article concludes by suggesting that
religious uses be given great deference when zoning regulations are
applied to such uses because of their contribution to the general welfare
of our country and because of First Amendment protection. Controlling
religious uses of land in advance with zoning regulation may constitute
an invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Additionally,
RFRA requires that any substantial burden on religion, justified by a
and homeowner associations.").
16 See, e.g., Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (discussing Christ Episcopal Church Parish House in
Manhasset which conducted a drug abuse program by arrangement with Long
Island Jewish Hospital); Teen Challenge v. Stonelick Township Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, No. 77-692 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1977) (denying nonprofit religious
organization's request for a zoning certificateto establish a teen alcohol and drug
counseling center was unreasonable and unlawful).
"7 Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554
(M.D. Fla. 1995); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862
F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL
118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995); St John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of
Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); Greentree at Murray Hill
Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1989);
Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church and State and the "Endorsement" of
Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Jurispru-
dence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823 (1989); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 13;
Michael W. Macleod-Ball, The Future of Zoning Limitations upon Religious Uses of
Land: Due Process or Equal Protection?, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087 (1988).
18 Accessory uses are those uses "customarily incidental to the main use"
which have been specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance. ANDERSON,
supra note 9, § 12.30, at 563.
'9 See infra notes 23-121 and accompanying text.
20 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (1993). See
infra notes 122-276 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 277-314 and accompanying text.
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compelling government interest, be accomplished by the least restrictive
means. Nuisance litigation provides a possible remedy to landowners who
are actually damaged by an unreasonable interference with the quiet
enjoyment of their property. Nuisance litigation also provides a less
restrictive means than zoning for regulating religious land uses and avoids
the problem of prior restraint that is inherent in proactive zoning
regulation. However, even when nuisance law is used and the court
balances the gravity of the harm to the residential landowner with the
utility of the conduct of the religious institution, a heavy thumb should
be placed on the scale of a religious use which serves a greater social
purpose - helping those in need.22
I. RELIGIOUS USES AND ACCESSORY USES
Courts and legislatures have historically protected religious institu-
tions to some degree from the application of zoning regulations.' The
majority of jurisdictions have concluded that religious uses may not be
excluded from areas zoned for residential use only.24 This majority rule
is, at times, supported by an application of the Free Exercise Clause, but
many cases have upheld the rule based on state constitutional grounds or
a finding that the exercise of the local government's police power was
arbitrary and in violation of due process.25 Although religious uses may
not be excluded in most jurisdictions, they may be subject to reasonable
regulation for purposes such as public health and safety.26
Many zoning regulations accommodate religious uses in residential
areas by providing that religious uses, and possibly also educational or
philanthropic uses, be either exempted entirely from the regulation or
22 See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
2 ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.21, at 538.
24 Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Marin, 233 Cal. App. 3d
130, 143 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Minney v. City of Azusa, 330 P.2d 255 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959)); 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF
& DAREN A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 20-23 (4th ed.
1975). Some states, such as California, however, treat religious uses the same as
any nonsectarian use when applying zoning restrictions.
25 Scott D. Godshall, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise
Clause, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1562, 1569 n.42 (1984); State ex rel. Wenatchee
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 312 P.2d 195, 199
(Wash. 1957) (holding that refusal by city officials to issue a special permit was
an arbitrary and unreasonable action, not in furtherance of health, safety, morals,
or general welfare).
26 ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.23, at 546.
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allowed to apply for special or conditional use permits to locate in an
otherwise residential neighborhood.27  Nevertheless, interpretation
problems and potential constitutional concerns arise in at least two
situations. The first situation is when local communities evaluate these
applications for issuance of a special or conditional permit, and the
second is when they decide whether a particular activity of a religious
institution already established in a residential neighborhood is an
"accessory use"'28 and allowed as a matter of right.29 This section will
focus on those cases dealing with the issue of whether a controversial
religious activity, which brings "outsiders" into a residential neighbor-
hood, is considered a "religious use" deserving of a special permit or is
an "accessory use" to an existing religious use.
A. What Constitutes a Religious Use?
Because religious uses are protected by the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause,3" it is likely that local government officials will
encounter a constitutional challenge if they attempt to exclude a particular
use from deferential treatment by determining that the use is not religious
in nature. Zoning officials have not, in reported case law, been faced
with the issue of whether the group proposing a particular use is actually
a bona fide religion. 2 The more common issue is whether a particular use
is religious, not because of its members' beliefs, but because of the use
27 Kali Bar Temple v. Board of Adjustment, 638 A.2d 839 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994); Jewish Reconstruction Synagogue, Inc. v. Incorporated Village,
342 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976); Susan L.
Goldberg, Gimme Shelter: Religious Provision of Shelter to the Homeless as a
Protected Use Under Zoning Laws, 30 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 75, 87
n.79 (1986).
28 See supra note 18.
29 "The right to establish and maintain a religious use includes the right to
establish and maintain uses which are accessory to it." Id.
30 See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 88 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
"' See ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.21, at 539 (explaining that courts have
invoked federal and state constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion to limit
municipal power to impose zoning restrictions on religious uses).
32 Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First
Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REv. 767, 771-72 & n.28 (1984) ("The Court has
recognized that non-traditional religious sects clearly qualify under a zoning
ordinance's provision for churches.").
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itself 3 This issue of what constitutes a religious use is to be resolved as
a question of fact.34 Jurisdictions vary in their treatment of this issue and
evaluate the use with several different approaches. 5
One commentator has identified at least four different approaches that
may be used to define a religious use.36 The first approach is a restrictive
one that narrowly construes the meaning of religious use.3 7 The second
approach looks at the use's purpose to determine whether the use is
religious or secular in nature, and declares that the religious identity of
the owner does not make the use religious.38 The third approach focuses
on the type of structure used for the proposed activity,39 and the fourth
views religious use broadly as "activity related to the purpose of a
religious organization."4 ° Depending upon which approach is used,
certain value judgments may need to be made by government officials or
judges who have been- influenced by traditional views of what constitutes
" Id. at 773; see, e.g., Diakonian Soc'y v. City of Chicago Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 380 N.E.2d 843,844, 846-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that religious
society housing 13 unrelated men in a single-family residential zone qualifies as
a monastery even though men were laymen and not religious professionals);
Schueller v. Board of Adjustment, 95 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa 1959) (holding
that married students' dormitory was permitted in a residential district as
religious use). But see Association for Educ. Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579,
580, 589 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (explaining that a group of men living together
as members of a religious society do not receive constitutional protection because
their primary vocation is not religious life or ministry).
34 ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.29, at 558; Goldberg, supra note 27, at 90
(arguing that cases involving an alleged religious use "are fact-specificand based
on local ordinances and state judicial interpretation").
" See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 90-97.
36 Id. at 96.
31 Id. at 90-91 (discussing the approach of Texas courts).
38 Id. at 91-92 (discussing the approach of Pennsylvania courts); see also
Vermont Baptist Convention v. Burlington Zoning Bd., 613 A.2d 710, 711 (Vt.
1992) (holding that a zoning ordinance must be construed according to the use
of the land and that "[a] distinction based upon the identity of the owner rather
than the public health, safety, morals or general welfare would be invalid").
39 State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217, 1222 (N.J. 1985) (stating that the
interpretation of term "church" should recognize the relevance of architectural
structure); ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.29, at 561 (pointing out that limitation
on religious use definition may be based on the kind of structure used);
Goldberg, supra note 27, at 92-93.
40 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 94 (examining New York's inclusive view of
religious uses).
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"religion."'" Certainly the first three approaches will require some
judgment as to what constitutes a religious use, purpose, or structure.
Because traditional views of religion may influence these zoning
decisions and impact nontraditional religious uses, deferential treatment
of requests for religious uses, as exemplified by the fourth approach, is
necessary to protect the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
worship.42 "Indeed, it was 'historical instances of religious persecution
and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise
Clause." 43
4" Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that there is no bright line for predicting which activities a secular
court will consider religious and "an organization might understandably be
concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of
mission") (citing Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336
(1987)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2741 (1994); Cameron, 498 A.2d at 1223
("[V]agueness attendant upon an interpretation [of the term church] that relies
primarily on an assumed common understanding of religion creates a real and
substantial risk of the ordinance being enforced against innocuous or protected
conduct."); see also Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 445
N.E.2d 343 (11. App. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
The only apparent difference between plaintiff's proposed use and the
uses made by the other religious associations is that plaintiff would use
its facility to practice and teach strict orthodox observance of Hasidic
practices and customs, and the other religious associations are using
their facilities to practice and teach what the community may view as
more palatable practices and customs.
Id.; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1,
14 [hereinafter Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise] ("[J]udges are more likely
to respond sympatheticallyto religious claims that are familiar, easily understood,
and unthreatening.").
42 State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village Bd. of Trustees, 108
N.W.2d288, 297 (Wis. 1961) (pointing out that "over-generousrelianceupon the
presumption of validity [of a zoning decision] may cloak discriminatory action
against a religious group which is too small a minority in the community to have
an effective voice"); Reynolds, supra note 32, at 768 ("[I]ncrease in and added
visibility of nontraditional religious groups, with practices and beliefs different
from those of the Judaeo-Christian majority, have prompted public opposition to
many of those groups' activities.").
" Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2226 (1993) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.)); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment See.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amend-
1995-96]
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The focus of this Article is not on those religious practices such as
animal sacrifice, 44 snake handling,45 or the religious use of peyote46 or
cannabis, 47 which do not fit within traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs.
Instead, this Article examines legislative and judicial reaction to the
active role that some religious institutions have taken in response to social
problems such as homelessness, drug abuse, and the AIDS epidemic.
Recent social activism by religious groups has created "land use
consequences that are more severe than those of the traditional, white
steepled building used for weekly prayer and occasional social gather-
ings."48 Activities such as feeding or sheltering the homeless, or even
such innocuous actions as allowing Alcoholics Anonymous49 or the Boy
Scouts to meet in church facilities may bring "outsiders" into the
residential community, generating additional noise and congestion.
ment protection."); Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity
v. Rosenfeld, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (arguing that
"public intolerance, animosity or unrest does not justify a prohibition of free
assembly and association"), appeal denied, 469 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1984).
44Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2231 (holding ordinance prohibiting animal
sacrifice by Santeria worshippers invalid because intended to suppress religion).
45 State ex rel. Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 111-12 (Tenn. 1975)
(holding snake handling prohibited in religious ceremonies), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 954 (1976).
46 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
873 (1990) (holding that Oregon could deny claimants unemployment compensa-
tion for work-related misconduct based on use of peyote because the Free
Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to
ceremonial ingestion of the drug).
4' Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 650-51 (Fla. 1979)
(involving a prohibition of the religious use of cannabis), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 803 (1980).
48 Reynolds, supra note 32, at 768; Michael Beebe, Neighbors Challenge
Ministry for Homeless, Drug Abusers, BuFF. NEws, Mar. 26, 1995, at Al
(involving residential neighborhood objections to church ministry for homeless
men which buses in crack-cocaine addicts from New York City); Hector Castro,
Church that Houses Homeless Sparks a Callfor Regulations, NEWS TRIB., Mar.
7, 1995, at B1 ("'Churches are being called upon to be social service providers
in our community,' [Tacoma City Councilman Steve Kirby] said at a council
meeting last week. 'It is way beyond what you ordinarily would have expected
decades ago."').
41 Karen De Witt, Cold Shoulder to Churches that Practice Preachings,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1994, at Al (involving neighbors who object to meetings
of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous held at church).
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When socially responsible activities sponsored by religious groups
conflict with land use regulation, these challenged activities are generally
analyzed as accessory uses to religious worship which require defer-
ence. 50 However, some cases have approached such disputes as an issue
of whether the activity constitutes a religious use.51 In First Assembly of
God v. Collier County,52 the church sought to enjoin the county from
enforcing zoning ordinances after the county Code Enforcement Board
found that a church's homeless shelter was not a "customary accessory
use" of church property permitted under applicable zoning and housing
codes.53 The court found there to be no distinction between a homeless
shelter involving a religious interest and a secular rooming house or
apartment house.54 Although the court did not frame the issue as a
question of whether a religious use existed, its finding was tantamount to
a decision that the homeless shelter was not a religious use entitled to a
religious-based exception. In justifying its decision to uphold the zoning
ordinance against a free exercise challenge, the court noted that the
church did not demonstrate that its religious beliefs required "having a
homeless shelter on the grounds of their church."56 The court's grant of
a summary judgment in favor of the county was upheld by the appellate
court, which found that the ordinance was facially neutral and not
intended to "inhibit or oppress any religion"'57 because it regulated the
homeless shelter as a group home, not as a religious use.58
51 See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
51 Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 549 A.2d 1076,
1081 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that use of church facilities for a book and
audiovisual center does not make use as a convent and chapel commercial instead
of religious); Diocese of Buffalo v. Buczkowski, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1019 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) (holding a care facility for the developmentally disabled a charitable
use, but not a religious use requiring constitutional protection), affd, 456
N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding that a drug center is a
religious use).
52 775 F. Supp. 383 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
53 Id. at 384.
54 Id. at 387.
55 Id. (holding that church could not "articulate a meaningful distinction"
and that "[t]he imposition of a religious based exception.., would effectively
prevent the county from enforcement of the zoning code").56 id.
" First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423, modified, 27
F.3d 526 (11th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995).
58 Id.
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A broader approach to defining a religious use was taken by the court
in Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,59 where the court aptly
explained that because the "essential moral alienation of drug abuse
seems most directly a religious problem," a drug center is a religious use
of church property." The court rejected the neighbors' argument that
"religious uses must be conducted by the church itself for the benefit of
its own members."'" In addressing the unspoken concern that "outsiders"
would invade the residential neighborhood, the court rhetorically asked:
"Is not the helping hand to others who have lost their way basic to divine
tradition? And cannot the ministry and congregants of the church
contribute their substance to this end and find contentment in their
giving?"'62 New Jersey courts have taken this broad approach to defining
a religious use, as evidenced by the court's decision in Saint John's
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City ofHoboken63 that a homeless shelter
operated by the church on its own property was a religious use.' The
court in Burlington Assembly of God v. Zoning Board of Adjustment65
also adopted the broad approach to defining religious uses.6 The court
determined that a proposed radio station located within a parochial school
with a program intended to "advance the religious beliefs of the church"
was a religious use protected by the constitution. 7
Where a proposed use is not accessory to a structure's principal use
as a place of worship, a narrower approach is taken in determining what
constitutes a religious use.68 Land uses which cannot be considered
accessory because there is not an established supporting religious use
may, nevertheless, qualify as religious uses themselves subject to
appropriate deference.69 However, when a particular activity is deemed
59 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
60 Id. at 944.
61 Id. at 946.
62 Id.
63 479 A.2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
64Id. at 938.
65 570 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
66 Id. at 497 (citing ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.29).
67 Id. at 499.
68 Bright Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 469 N.Y.S.2d 851,
854, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (concluding that a Christian Science healing
center not located on the same property as the church is not a religious use).
69 Id. at 856 ("[W]here the use itself is found to be religious, the same
exemption from zoning restrictions afforded churches and other places of worship
is applicable.").
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accessory to an already permitted religious use, such an accessory
use may be given more deference and courts may be more flexible in
interpreting what constitutes a religious use under a local zoning
ordinance.7° In fact, "the right to establish and maintain a reli-
gious use includes the right to establish and maintain accessory us-
es."71
B. What Constitutes an Accessory Use?
Religious institutions may generally use their property for "accessory
uses and activities which go beyond just prayer and worship." 2 An
accessory use is a use that is considered "customarily incidental" to a
property's primary use.73 Typical accessory uses to a religious use
include parking and educational facilities.74 However, the home of a
70 Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding
an ordinance exempting church-operated nursery schools and day-care centers
from special use requirement), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2741 (1994); Yeshiva &
Mesivta Toras Chaim v. Rose, 523 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(holding that a private school for Jewish children is educational, not religious,
because it is not an accessory use to a preexisting religious use and "[a]ffiliation
with or supervision by religious organizations does not, per se, transform
institutions into religious ones").
"' City of Las Cruces v. Huerta, 692 P.2d 1331, 1333 (N.M. Ct. App.)
(holding that a parochial school is not an accessory use), cert. denied, 693 P.2d
591 (N.M. 1984).
72 Diocese of Rochesterv. Planning Bd., 136 N.E.2d 827, 836 (N.Y. 1956)
("A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the opportunity to
worship God.") (quoting Community Synagogue v. Bates, 136 N.E.2d 488, 493
(N.Y. 1956)); North Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman, 481 N.Y.S.2d 142,
144-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that a "proposed center for the
performing arts is sufficiently related to the academy's overall educational and
religious purposes to entitle it to the constitutional protections generally accorded
to educational and religious uses"); Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. Good
ShepherdEpiscopal Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (citing
Community Synagogue v. Bates, 136 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1956)); RATHKOPF &
RATHKOPF, supra note 24, at 20-28; Terry Rice, Re-Evaluating the Balance
Between Zoning Regulations and Religious and Educational Uses, 8 PACE L.
REv. 1, 1-2 (1988) (noting that the concept of what constitutes religious activity
is expanding).
'3 ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.30, at 563.
7' Creative Country Day Sch., Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals,
219 A.2d 789, 799 (Md. 1966) ("[P]arochial schools.., from early times...
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clergyman," a lighted recreational field,76 and even a coffeehouse for
college students" have qualified in some cases as valid accessory uses.
The issue of what constitutes an accessory use arises when an area zoned
for residential use only specifically excepts churches.78 This exception
allows a residential property to be used for religious worship, as well as
for any activities that are determined to be "accessory" to religious
worship.79 When a religious institution has obtained a special permit or
exception allowing operation of a main religious use, an accessory use
may later arise which generates additional noise, traffic, congestion, or
the influx of people from "outside" the neighborhood. Local residents
may then seek to challenge the validity of the religious exception from
the zoning regulations as to the accessory use. These disputes over the
allowance of accessory uses tend to be resolved in one of two ways."°
First, courts may permit an accessory use as long as it is supported by
some religious purpose."' Second, a court may refuse to allow an
have always been considered as properly operated by religious institutions as
incidental to religious institutions."); City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist
Church, 382 A.2d 377, 379-80 (N.H. 1978) (concluding that where church
members believed their children should receive a bible-oriented education every
day of the week, the church-relatedschool was a facility "usually connectedwith
a church"). But see Hillsboro-West End Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropoli-
tan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. O1AO1-9406-CH-00282, 1995 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 120, at *7-9 (Feb. 24, 1995) (holding that there was no evidence in the
record supporting the Board's grant of variance from parking requirements, but
permitting new classrooms by right as ancillary to worship services).
7- Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 40 A.2d 423, 425-
26 (Pa. 1945) (holding a rabbi's residence to be accessory to a synagogue).
76 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Ashton, 448 P.2d 185, 188 (Idaho
1968) (holding that a reasonable recreational facility is an accessoryuse included
in the meaning of the term "churches").
7 Synod of Chesapeake, Inc. v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611, 614 (Del.
Ch. 1969) (issuing a preliminary injunction where the church demonstrated that
it was reasonably probable that the use as a coffeehouse would be shown "to
relate ... to [the church's] attempt to make Christianity meaningful to
questioning young persons").
78 Godshall, supra note 25, at 1568 n.39.
79 id.
'o Id. at 1570 n.43.
s' Id. (citing Synod of Chesapeake, Inc. v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611
(Del. Ch. 1969) (holding a coffeehouse to be an accessory use); Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v. Ashton, 448 P.2d 185, 188 (Idaho 1968) (lighted softball
stadium); Board of Zoning Appeals v. New Testament Bible Church, Inc., 411
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exception for an accessory use that is not "traditionally" church relat-
ed.
82
An accessory use is sheltered under the "cloak of immunity which
traditionally has been extended" 3 to churches so long as this additional
activity is "'customary with and subordinate to"'"4 the primary use as
a house of worship." In Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals, "churches
and other places of worship and related accessory uses" were permitted
uses in a residential district and did not require a special use permit.8 6 A
Jewish synagogue was thus a permitted use, but the issue was whether it
could provide unrestricted overnight accommodations to fulfill its
religious mission. 7 The nontraditional synagogue provided "a place for
devout persons to spend several days together for the purpose of prayer,
celebration of festivals and religious events, Jewish study, and meals
satisfying religious requirements."" The Connecticut Supreme Court
found that sleeping accommodations were essential to the synagogue's
religious fellowship and that the lower court finding that such accommo-
dations were not related as an accessory use to the synagogue's right to
worship was erroneous. 9 The court noted that deciding what is customary
for "nontraditional religious practices cannot depend upon what is
customary among more traditional religious groups" and that such a
decision about "the particular tenets of a recognized religious group is not
a matter for secular decision." 90
Although a majority of jurisdictions accept as valid a wide variety of
accessory uses attached to established religious primary uses,9 some
N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (dormitory for teachers)).
82 Id. (citing Sexton v. Bates, 85 A.2d 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951)
(denying a permit for construction of a mikvah), affid sub nom. Sexton v. Essex
County Ritualarium, 91 A.2d 162 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1952); Archdiocese
of Portland v. County of Washington, 458 P.2d 682, 687 (Or. 1969) (en banc)
(affirming denial of permit for construction of religious school on church
property); Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
(affirming denial of permit for construction of "healing rooms" on church
property)).
83 Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 418 A.2d 82, 86 (Conn. 1979).
84id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 84.
87 rd.
88 Id. at 84 n.1.
89 Id. at 87.
90 Id.
9' City of Minneapolis v. ChurchUniversal & Triumphant, 339 N.W.2d 880,
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courts have held that certain activities related to established religious uses
do not qualify as accessory uses.92 For example, in Seward Chapel, Inc.
v. City of Seward,93 the Supreme Court of Alaska determined that a
parochial school could be legislatively excluded as an accessory use
without violating constitutional principles.94 The court affirmed the lower
court findings that other zones in the city permitted churches and schools
in the same building and that "'t]here is no religious belief relating to
the location of the school building itself."' 95 Trial testimony established
that "providing a Christian education for children is an integral aspect of
the church members' religious beliefs,"96 but the court held that the city
was not required by the First Amendment to accommodate these beliefs
by abandoning its zoning restriction.97 Because there was no showing that
a religious belief required members of Seward Chapel to locate in the
particular residential area which excluded schools, the court found that
the zoning ordinance did not interfere with the members' religious
beliefs. 98
A legislative definition of what qualifies as an accessory use was also
at issue in Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach.99 In
this case, the City legislatively declared that "[h]omeless shelters and
food banks are not customarily related activities" to avoid having to treat
such uses with constitutional deference.' The court upheld this
888-89 (Minn. 1983) (holding that residential use of church property is an
accessory use because monastery "furthers the purposes of the church in
extending its teachings and ministry to the community"); Goldberg, supra note
27, at 97-98 (citing City of Minneapolis, 339 N.W.2d at 889).
92 Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 661 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Ark. 1983)
(concluding that "a conditional use permit for a church does not automatically
authorize the operation of a full-time parochial school") (citing Seward Chapel,
Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982)); Hull v. Miami Shores
Village, 435 So. 2d 868, 869-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an
administrative centerlocated on church property is nota related or accessoryuse
since less than one percent of services provided by center would be for benefit
of the local church).
93 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
94 Id. at 1295, 1297.
95 Id. at 1297 n.ll.
96 Id. at 1299.
97 Id. at 1300-01.
98 Id. at 1302.
99 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
'00 Id. at 1556.
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exclusion from the code definition of a "customary accessory use" of
church or religious institution property because it found the code to be
"neutral and of general applicability."10 1 Rather than explain why
homeless shelters and food banks did not qualify as accessory uses, the
court relied on a finding that the "City code regulates conduct, not
religious belief' and determined that the code was not "aimed at
impeding religion.""1 2 Courts in California and Oregon have also
justified a strict construction of the term accessory use by reference to the
states' view that religious uses should be treated the same as any other
land use when zoning regulations are applied.'0 3
Accessory uses that bring in people from outside the immediate
residential community often generate controversy with local residents. 14
In Jacobi v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,0 5 residents argued that a
proposed parochial school would draw students from a county outside the
county in which the school was physically located."°6 The court interpret-
ed this argument as a contention that "the general welfare is jeopardized
when children and churchgoers from Philadelphia County attend school
and church in Montgomery County" and dismissed it without com-
ment.1
07
The problem of keeping out people who are not members of the local
residential community is especially acute when places of worship, located
in affluent neighborhoods, seek to assist nonresidents from a different
"walk of life." A prime example of this type of controversy occurred in
the Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment'08
101 Id. at 1588.
12 Id. (citing First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 775 F. Supp. 383, 386
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that "the zoning ordinance as applied ... regulate[d]
housing the homeless on church property, [and] not one's belief in doing so?)).
103 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 98 n.157 (citing Damascus Community
Church v. Clackamas County, 610 P.2d 273 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), appeal
dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); Medford Assembly of God v. City of Medford,
695 P.2d 1379, 1380 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a school is not an
accessory use to permitted church use and requires a separate permit), review
denied, 700 P.2d 251 (Or.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985)).
104 See, e.g., In re Garden City Jewish Ctr., 157 N.Y.S.2d 435, 438 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1956) (explaining that "meetings of the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts
composed of children of the congregation" are religious uses).
15 196 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1964).
106 Id. at 745-46.
107 Id. at 746.
lOS 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-
7189, 1995 WL 118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
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case, where residents of an "outstanding neighborhood""1 9 in Washing-
ton, D.C. complained to the zoning administrator about a church's
program to feed the homeless. "0 The residents contended that the feeding
program would attract the homeless to the neighborhood, resulting in
more crime and a decline in property values."' Although the court was
sensitive to the community's concerns,"' it held that the church should
be allowed to conduct its "very worthwhile program" unless it became a
nuisance." 3 This holding was based on a finding that "the Church's
feeding program in every respect is religious activity and a form of
worship."".4 Because the court considered the feeding program to be an
accessory use, it concluded that "[t]he Church may use its building for
prayer and other religious services as a matter of right and should be
able, as a matter of right, to use the building to minister to the
needy." 15
Legislatures and courts have continued to struggle with balancing
zoning regulation against religious freedom. Some jurisdictions have
handled this conflict by giving a broad interpretation to the term
"religious use."".6 Others have strictly construed the term, treating land
use issues involving religious groups the same as any other land use
issue."7 Defining what constitutes an accessory use, allowed as a matter
of right, has also been an area where courts have differed as to the level
of deference given to a religious organization's activities carried on in
addition to its primary use as a place of worship. Court views have
ranged from statements such as "[z]oning boards have no role to play in
telling a religious organization how it may practice its religion""' to "a
church is to be treated just like any nonsectarian enterprise when
determining the extent of its compliance with zoning legislation."' 9
109 Id. at 546.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 id.
"s Id. at 547. See infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text, discussing
constitutional issues involved in this decision.
1.6 Reynolds, supra note 32, at 776-77.
117 Id.
118 Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538, 546 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995
WL 118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
"9 Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Marin, 284 Cal. Rptr. 427,
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Nevertheless, in the majority of jurisdictions,' once the use has been
determined to be either religious or accessory to an existing and permitted
religious use, the First Amendment will protect such use against any law
that would "substantially burden" the free exercise of religion.'
2 '
II. FREE EXERCISE PRINCIPLES AFFECTING
ZONING REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS USES
A. Current Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause Analysis
The Free Exercise Clause found in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution "bars government action aimed at suppressing
religious belief or practice."' 2 But if a "neutral, generally applicable"
law has only the effect of prohibiting religious exercise, the rule
announced in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith will allow such a prohibition without violating the Free Exercise
Clause. 4 Not long after the Smith decision, the Court in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah2 1 found that the laws at issue were
"designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices" and were,
therefore, void. 6 The laws in question in the Lukumi case targeted the
animal sacrifice rituals of the Santeria religion.'27 Because the ordinances
"had as their object the suppression of religion ' ' " and were not of
general applicability, the Smith requirements of neutrality or general
applicability were not met, and the Court subjected the ordinances
434 (Ct. App. 1991).
120 Reynolds, supra note 32, at 777; Evan Gahr, Communities and Churches
Clash over Zoning Issues, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1995, at 15 (National & World
Affairs; Nation: Religion) ("Under the California rule, churches were treated just
like any landowner. But the New York rule, which severely limited the powers
of zoning boards over churches and synagogues, often prevailed .... 'Historical-
ly, the New York rule has dominated in the United States, [but there] have been
more courts swinging to California."').
121 Western Presbyterian Church, 862 F. Supp. at 544.
122 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2240 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause applies to the states).
'2 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).
124 Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
2 Id.
126 Id. at 2234.
127 Id. at 2224.
2 1 d. at 2231.
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to a strict scrutiny analysis. '29 The Lukumi Court applied a compelling
interest standard and found that the government's interests were not
sufficiently compelling 3 ' and that, even if those interests had been
compelling, the ordinances were not narrowly drawn to meet them."'
State and local governments rarely burden a religious practice
intentionally.' Although such intentional interference did occur in
Lukumi, most land use regulation will typically be neutral and generally
applicable to any regulated use, whether it be secular or religious in
nature.' The harder, and more typical, case is where a generally
applicable zoning ordinance burdens the exercise of religious belief' 34
The Smith rule, according to Justice Souter, would allow such a burden
under the Free Exercise Clause because the ordinance is a "'neutral,
generally applicable"' law.'35 Justice Souter, as well as many commen-
tators, argues that the Smith rule should, at some point, be reexam-
ined.'36 Under Justice Souter's analysis, the Smith rule only requires
"formal neutrality" - laws which do not have the intent to discriminate
against religion - while the Free Exercise Clause also requires "substan-
tive neutrality," which requires the government "to accommodate
religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally
129 Id. at 2223.
130 The interests asserted by the city were protecting the public health and
preventing cruelty to animals. Id. at 2232.
13 Id. at 2233.
132 Id. at 2250 (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
133 Id. (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (emphasizing that govern-
ment rarely "explicitly targets religion... for disfavored treatment").
134 Id. at 2251-52 (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) ("A harder case
would be presented if petitioners were requesting an exemption from a generally
applicable anticruelty law.").
135 Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990)).
136 Id. (Souter, J., concurring); John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and
Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L.
REV. 71 (1991-92); James D. Gordon 1H, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79
CAL. L. REv. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883 (1993-94) [hereinafter
Laycock, Free Exercise and the RFRA]; Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise,
supra note 41, at 1-4; Michael W. McConnell, Free ExerciseRevisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting
Paradigms ofReligious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
7.
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neutral laws."'37 Thus, the current constitutional standard under the Free
Exercise Clause, as expressed in Smith, requires only that a land use
ordinance be neutral and generally applicable, and not be enacted for the
purpose of prohibiting religion.
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Although the Court views the Free Exercise Clause as just guarantee-
ing "formal neutrality," Congress spoke in favor of "substantive
neutrality" when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(',.FRA")1 38 in 1993.139 Congress found that in the Smith case, "the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion."'4 One of the stated purposes of RFRA, as set forth in §
2000bb(b)(1), is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its applica-
tion in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened.""... RFRA "is an effort to enact the theory that the free exercise
of religion is a substantive civil liberty, that the religious minorities
among us get to practice their faith and not merely to think about it or to
believe in it."' 42 Under RFRA, the constitutional standard to be applied
to neutral and generally applicable land use ordinances that burden
religious freedom is the rule from Sherbert v. Verner,'43 which requires
137 Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2241 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing generally
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1989-90) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality
Toward Religion]).
138 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(Supp. V 1989-94).
,9 Laycock, FreeExerciseand the RFRA, supra note 136, at 897 ("Congress
adheres to the view that religious liberty is a substantive liberty and that no
substantial burden should be placed on a religious practice without a compelling
interest.").
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
141 Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
142 Laycock, Free Exercise and the RFRA, supra note 136, at 895 ("It is an
attempt to create a statutory right to the free exercise of religion, pursuant to
Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore presumably to enforce all the rights
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.").
"43 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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that laws imposing a burden on religious practice be narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling state interest.'" The Sherbert standard was
strengthened by the Court's later decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
14
1
which upheld the right of Amish parents to direct the education of
their children in the face of a neutral compulsory school attendance
law.
1 46
Assuming that RFRA withstands constitutional challenge, 47 most
religious liberty litigation in the future will likely focus on the federal
statute or a state constitution rather than the federal Constitution.
48
Nevertheless, judicial application of the resurrected Sherbert and Yoder
compelling interest test will require reference to decisions interpreting this
rule prior to its demise in Smith. 49 In addition to looking at recent
cases decided under RFRA, this section will examine land use decisions
prior to the development of the Smith rule in order to predict how
conflicts between socially beneficial religious uses that bring outsiders
into residential neighborhoods and facially neutral ordinances restricting
such uses will likely be resolved under RFRA. Under RFRA, two key
'44 Id. at 402-03.
14 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
146 Id. at 235-36. In Yoder, the Court clearly saw the issue as involving
"'conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause' even against enforcement of
a 'regulation of general applicability."' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2245 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220).
"41 See Sasnettv. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305, 1320 (W.D.
Wis. -1995) (holding that RFRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress'
power under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp.
510,516-17 (D. Haw. 1995) (RFRA constitutional); Statev. Miller, No. 94-0159,
1995 Wis. App. LEXIS 945 (Aug. 3, 1995) ("RFRA violates no federal
constitutional principles."); Laycock, Free Exercise and the RFRA, supra note
136, at 896-97 (discussing likely constitutional challenge to the Act because of
the conflict between the branches and its probable rejection, similar to the result
in challenges to the Voting Rights Act).
148 Laycock, Free Exercise and the RFRA, supra note 136, at 897 (stating
this also "means that if an unpopular religion prevails in court and Congress gets
excited enough about it, Congress can amend the statute to cut that religion
out").
14" See Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538, 545 (D.D.C. 1994) ("Congress enacted the RFRA to restore the law
regarding religious freedom to its state prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith."), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL 118016 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 3, 1995).
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elements must be analyzed. First, the court must decide whether the
government has substantially burdened the exercise of religion, even if
the law is of general applicability.'s Second, the court must determine
whether the government can justify such a burden because it furthers a
compelling governmental interest and whether it is the least restrictive
means of doing So.15
1. What Constitutes a Substantial Burden?
When deciding whether a government regulation infringes upon
religious freedom, the court's primary concern "must necessarily be the
cost, economic or otherwise, attached to religious observance."1 52 A
financial burden created by government regulation does not necessarily
constitute an impermissible burden on religious freedom so long as such
a burden does not violate sincere religious beliefs. 53 For example, in
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood,'54 the Sixth Circuit identified the burdens on the church to
be "an indirect financial burden and a subjective aesthetic burden"
because the locations in the city where a church could be built were more
expensive and "less conducive to worship" than the location where the
church was requesting permission to build. 5 s The court held that the
ordinance's "financial and aesthetical imposition" on the church did not
infringe the church's freedom of religion because the ordinance "'simply
regulates a secular activity and, as applied to the appellants, operates so
as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive."'156
'10 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
151 Id. § 2000bb-l(b).
152 Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
... See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,
392 (1990) ("[C]ollection and payment of the generally applicable tax in this
case imposes no constitutionally significant burden on appellant's religious
practices or beliefs .... ).
154 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
155 Id. at 307.
15 6 Id. at 307-08 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 605 (1961) (holding that a statute does not infringe upon religious freedom
by making religious observance more expensive)); see also Messiah Baptist
Churchv. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 825 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[F]inancial
consequences to the church do not rise to infringement of religious freedom."),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
1995-961
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In a case quite similar to Lakewood, the Eleventh Circuit in Grosz v.
City of Miami Beach, Florida"7 found that zoning regulations which
prohibited plaintiffs from holding religious services in their home did not
substantially burden religious freedom since such religious uses were
permitted in at least half of Miami Beach territory."' The court noted
that although there may be an impact on religious practice "in terms of
convenience, dollars or aesthetics" by requiring the plaintiffs to relocate
to a properly zoned area, the burden is lower than in previous free
exercise cases since it "plainly does not rise to the level of criminal
liability, loss of livelihood, or denial of a basic income sustaining public
welfare benefit."'5 9 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit developed a test
to determine how to accommodate the conflicting constitutional values of
free exercise rights and the state police power.60 During the balancing
part of the test, the Grosz court weighed the burden on religion, which
it found to be incidental, against the burden on the government interest
in zoning objectives, which it found to be substantial.'61 This Grosz test
has been used by courts in other jurisdictions, as well as by Eleventh
Circuit courts, when land use issues involving religious uses have
arisen.'62 The balancing portion of the test appears to be a method of
157 721 F.2d 729, 748 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (citing Lakewood, Ohio Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
158 Id. at 740 (pointing in contrast to the Lakewood case where the City of
Lakewood permitted church buildings on about 10% of its land).
'59 Id. at 739 & n.9.
160 Grosz, 721 F.2dat 733 ("Beforeacourt balances competing governmental
and religious interest [sic], the challenged government action must pass two
threshold tests.").
161 Id. at 741.
162 See, e.g., First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 424
(using Grosz test to hold burden placed on one county by allowing the violation
outweighs the church's burden to conform or move to an appropriately zoned
area), modified, 27 F.3d 526 (11th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730
(1995); Islamic Ctr., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 301-02 (5th Cir.
1988) (stating that the burden on religion is substantial where ordinance left no
practical alternatives); Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach,
885 F. Supp. 1554, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (using Grosz to hold a zoning
ordinance prohibiting the plaintiffs from building a homeless shelter valid);
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson County, 741 F. Supp.
1522, 1535 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (using the Grosz test to conclude that ordinance
violated First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution); Bethel
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533, 538 (Ill.
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constitutional analysis that converts the Sherbert compelling interest test
into a balancing exercise, and one author has observed that
[T]he recent federal appellate court decisions [Lakewood and Grosz]
clearly stand for the proposition that zoning ordinances which serve a
legitimate public purpose by excluding from certain residential areas
church buildings or regular worship services in homes do not violate the
First Amendment where such ordinances place only an "incidental
economic burden" on religious freedom and where alternative channels
and opportunities are left open for religious conduct.
163
As observed above, most courts have found there to be no substantial
burden on religious freedom when a church is not allowed to operate at
a particular location, so long as other locations are available in the
general community.'" The Ninth Circuit in Christian Gospel Church,
Inc. v. City of San Franciscos5 found there to be no significant burden
on religious practice where a church was denied a special permit to allow
it to conduct worship services in a residential neighborhood. 66 The
court noted that the church did not make a showing as to why it was
important to worship in the particular house for which it was requesting
a special permit, especially considering that the church had previously
worshipped in a hotel banquet room. 67 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in
App. Ct.) (holding that an enrollment cap on parochial school attendance is not
unconstitutional under the balancing test in Grosz), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d
835 (Ill. 1990).
163 Islamic Cr., Inc., 840 F.2d at 302 (quoting Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Local
Land Control of Religious Uses and Symbols, in 1985 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 344 (J. Gailey ed., 1985)).
" Id.; see also Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21680, at *11-12 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1991) (stating that
zoning codes allowed parochial schools in two areas without special exemptions),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992); Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San
Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.) (finding that government action did
not prevent all home worship, just worship in a specific home), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 999 (1990). But see McCurry v. Tesch, 738 F.2d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1984)
("Here, we need not consider whether alternative sites for worship would be open
to the plaintiffs. Our inquiry ends with the holding that the state could achieve
its objectives in a way less burdensome to the free exercise of religion."), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
16 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990).
166 Id. at 1224-25.
167 Id. at 1224 (holding that the "burden on religious practice in this zoning
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Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors68 held that a zoning regula-
tion, which prohibited the church from building a parochial school in a
residential zone without a special exception, was not a significant burden on
the church's religious rights. 69 Even though the zoning law made it more
difficult to locate the school on property of the church's choice, there was no
"nexus between the government regulation ... and impairment of ability to
carry out a religious mission.""'
When, however, it appears that a facially neutral exclusion of religious
uses in residential neighborhoods is being applied unfairly, courts may find
that a particular religion has been substantially burdened. For example, the
Fifth Circuit in Islamic Center, Inc. v. City of Starkville 7' found a burden
on the free exercise of religion when city zoning officials refused to permit
a building located in a residential neighborhood adjacent to property being
used as a church by another faith, to be used as a Muslim mosque.'72 In the
City of Starkville, the use of buildings as churches in areas near the
University of Mississippi campus was prohibited unless city officials granted
an exception.'73 Muslim university students and faculty members formed
the Islamic Center to provide group worship opportunities and purchased a
residence near the campus to use as a place for worship. 7 The court held
that the city's refusal to grant an exception to the Islamic Center violated the
Free Exercise of Religion Clause because the city failed to establish that it
had a sufficient reason for denying the exception when it had granted requests
for exceptions to nine Christian churches in similarly regulated areas.'75 The
court found that the "burden placed on relatively impecunious Muslim
students by the Starkville ordinance is more than incidental, and the ordinance
leaves no practical alternatives for establishing a mosque in the city
limits.'
176
scheme is minimal").
168 No. 90-2406, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21680 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992).
169 Id. at *11-12.
170 Id. at *13-14 (explaining that a location preference must be linked to
religious tenets).
17 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
172 Id. at 294.
173 id.
174 Id. at 295.
171 Id. at 294 (setting forth as evidence the fact that 25 Christian churches
were located in areas with similar regulations, nine of which moved in after the
regulation).
176 Id. at 302.
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A secondary concern in deciding whether a government regulation
burdens free exercise is the "centrality of the burdened religious
observance to the believer's faith." '177 While "[r]eligious observances in
the form of beliefs are absolutely protected from governmental infringe-
ment,"'78 religious "[p]ractices flowing from religious beliefs" are only
protected when they are "integrally related to the underlying beliefs." '179
In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City
of Lakewood,"80 the "religious observance" at issue was the building of
a church in a residential neighborhood.' The Sixth Circuit found that
building and owning a church is not a "fundamental tenet" of the
Jehovah's Witnesses' religious beliefs and that "[n]o pressure is placed
on the Congregation to abandon its beliefs and observances. '1 2 The
Tenth Circuit in Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson"3 also
distinguished religious belief from religious conduct and found there to
be no evidence to support the church's argument that "building a church
or building a church on the particular site is intimately related to the
religious tenets of the church."'8 4
While one of the most common conflicts between religious uses and
zoning is the exclusion of churches from residential zones,"5 a recent
case decided by the Washington Supreme Court analyzed the substantial
burden test as applied to a landmark preservation ordinance.186 The
court in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle held that the city's
landmark preservation provisions infringed upon the church's religious
freedom because they required the church to seek approval from a secular
board whenever any architectural changes were contemplated.'87 The
court found that such a requirement impermissibly burdened the church's
right to free exercise by requiring approval for alterations that may be
necessitated by the religious observances of the church and by reducing
'.. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
178 Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 303.
m Id. at 306.
'
82 Id. at 307 ("Congregation may build a church in Lakewood only in
commercial or multi-family residential district.").
183 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
184 Id. at 824-25 (citing Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307).
185 Godshall, supra note 25, at 1568.
186 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
187 Id. at 219.
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the value of the church's property. '88 This substantial burden on the
church's right to freely exercise religion was not justified by the city's
interest in preservation of aesthetic and historic structures, which the
court did not find to be compelling. '89 The government may burden
religious exercise, but only if a compelling state interest justifies the
burden. 190
2. Is There a Compelling State Interest?
Once a court determines that a religious use is at issue and a
government regulation has substantially burdened the free exercise of
religious freedom by regulating such use, the regulation will be constitu-
tionally invalid unless the government can demonstrate that a compelling
state interest justifies the burden.' In Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,'92 the Court applied the compelling interest
test to an ordinance which prohibited animal sacrifice and found the
ordinance to be a "law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or
not of general application."'1 93 The Lukumi Court, operating under the
Smith rule, 194 explained that the "compelling interest standard that we
apply once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements is not 'watered ...
down' but 'really means what it says."'' 95 The Court then found that
the government interests in protecting the public health and preventing
cruelty to animals were not sufficiently compelling to justify interfering
with conduct protected by the First Amendment and were not narrowly
tailored to meet such interests.
196
Although the Supreme Court in Lukumi announced its intention to
apply a compelling interest test that is not "watered down, '1 97 some
188 Id. at 219-20.
189 Id. at 223.
'90 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
191 Id.; Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); see also Town v.
State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1979) (holding that the "State of
Florida has a compelling interest in restricting the use of cannabis as a religious
practice"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 803 (1980).
192 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
193 Id. at 2233.
194 See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
195 Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)).
196 Id. at 2234.
'9' Id. at 2233; Rust v. Clarke, 851 F. Supp. 377, 380 n.4 (D. Neb. 1994)
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lower courts have found a compelling state interest whenever government
uses its police power to regulate in a neutral manner. 98 For example,
in Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San Francisco,'99 the Ninth
Circuit found that a minimal burden on the church's religious practice by
restricting home worship was outweighed by San Francisco's "strong
interest in the maintenance of the integrity of its zoning scheme and the
protection of its residential neighborhoods."200 The court held that
because the "government's interests in not allowing an exception to the
zoning provision are... strong" and the burden on religious freedom is
minimal, "the zoning scheme requiring the grant of a conditional use
permit for worship services to be held in this residential neighborhood
does not violate the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause of the [F]irst [A]mend-
ment.
' 201
Nevertheless, there are times when zoning regulations may justifiably
restrict a religious group from using its facility in a manner that is un-
safe.202 In Congregation Beth Yitzchok, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo,
203
the court determined that code provisions governing "unquestionably
important safety requirements" could be enforced against a synagogue
operating a nursery school because "[s]uch an interest is of a magnitude
to justify even substantial inroads on the free exercise of religion."2'
Minimum health and safety requirements should be enforceable by
government officials regardless of incidental interferences with religious
freedom.
205
(pointing out that the decision in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987), "seemed to water-down the 'compelling interest test' that had previously
been applied in the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence").
198 See, e.g., infra notes 206-76 and accompanying text (discussing recent
homeless decisions).
1 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990).
200 1d. at 1224.
201 Id. at 1225.
202 See Congregation Beth Yitzchok, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp.
655, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("'[W]hen in conflict with legitimate zoning concerns
as public safety, health and welfare, the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of
religious expression cannot be viewed as absolute.' ' (quoting Holy Spirit Ass'n
v. Town of New Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1979))).
203 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
204 Id. at 663.
205 See id. at 660, where the court quotes counsel for the city at oral
argument:
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3. Recent Homeless Decisions
At least three recent cases involving caring for the homeless by
religious groups have referred to RFRA. °6 Two of the cases decided
claims based on the application of the RFRA,z°7 while one observed
that the Act may apply to the case, but since it was not raised by
either party it was not discussed.0 8 In the first case, Western
Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,0 9 the court found
"the Church's feeding program to be religious conduct falling within the
protections of the First Amendment and RFRA,"'21 and applied the
RFRA standard to determine that the church's right to free exercise
of religion had been impermissibly burdened.2 ' Before subjecting
the challenged zoning ordinances to constitutional scrutiny, the
court determined that feeding the homeless was protected religious
conduct.212 The ordinances at issue in this case were facially
neutral in that the proposed use was "not a use permitted as a matter
of right in a residential zone, and was a prohibited use in the
special purpose zone., 213 Because the church was located in a "split
I wouldn't be here, or we wouldn't have had the plaintiff into court in
the first instance had this been a question of setback. We are not talking
about technical violations of whether a side yard should be 50 feet, a
front yard 75 feet. We are talking about the lives of children.
206 First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, modified, 27 F.3d
526 (1 1th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995); Daytona Rescue
Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995);
Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538
(D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL 118016
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
207 Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1556 (applying RFRA to
exclude homeless shelters from the definition of church or religious institution);
Western Presbyterian Church, 862 F. Supp. at 544 (applying RFRA to invalidate
a zoning ordinance).
208 First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 424 n.5 (applying the Supreme Court's
Free Exercise Clause analysis and the Grosz test to determine that the Free
Exercise Clause was not violated by zoning ordinances).
209 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-
7189, 1995 WL 118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
210 Id. at 544.
211 Id. at 547.
212 Seesupra notes 30-71 and accompanyingtext (discussing what constitutes
a religious or accessory use).
213 Western Presbyterian Church, 862 F. Supp. at 540.
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zone,""2 4 the church was required to obtain a special exception for the
residential zone and a variance for the special purpose zone in order to
conduct its feeding program."' The church challenged the requirement to
obtain a variance as a violation of its statutory and constitutional rights.
21 6
In applying the RFRA standard, the Western Presbyterian Church court
determined that the District of Columbia zoning regulations substantially
burdened the church's free exercise of religion.2 7 The court concluded that
feeding the needy is an important religious function, and once a church is
permitted in a particular location, the city may not regulate what religious
functions the church conducts.1 s Such regulation of religious conduct
through zoning action "is a substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion."219 If a law substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, "the
government must demonstrate that it has a compelling governmental interest
in such a burden and that the interest could not be protected by a less
restrictive means."22 The compelling interest portion of this test was not
an issue in this case because the District of Columbia conceded that it had no
compelling interest in prohibiting the church from feeding the needy at its
location as long as appropriate controls were in place.22' However, the court
did leave open the possibility that the feeding program could be discontinued
if the controls did not adequately address the neighbors' concerns and as a
result, became a nuisance. 2
The Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City ofDaytona Beach223 decision
is another example of how current constitutional analysis and RFRA have
been applied to resolve a conflict between land use ordinances and the
feeding and housing of the homeless by a religious organization.224 In
Daytona, the court upheld the city's statutory exclusion of homeless shelters
and food banks from its definition of "Church or Religious Institution" so that
214 Id. at 540 n.1 (explaining that part of the lot was in the residential zone
and part of it was located in the special purpose zone).
215 Id. at 540-41.
216 Id. at 542.
217 Id. at 546.
218 I]d.
219 Id. at 547.
220 Id. at 545.
22' Id. (pointing out that the defendants relied only on the argument that the
zoning regulations did not substantially burden the church's free exercise of religion).
222 Id. at 546. See infra notes 277-314 and accompanying text (discussing
the role of nuisance law as a viable land use control for religious uses).
2 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
24 Id. at 1555.
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such uses would be required to seek a conditional use permit. 25 The
church itself was a permitted use in the particular zone, but the proposed
homeless shelter and food bank program were not considered accessory
uses.226 In analyzing the constitutional challenge to the city's statutory
exclusion of these homeless programs, the court employed the current
Supreme Court analysis, RFRA, and the three-part test used by the
Eleventh Circuit in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Florida2. to decide
whether the Free Exercise Clause had been violated.228
Using the current Supreme Court analysis, as delineated in the
Lukumi decision,229 the Daytona court found that "the city code is
neutral and of general applicability" and that "an entity seeking to
establish a homeless shelter or food bank must meet the zoning require-
ments for that particular use in the particular zoning district regardless of
whether the entity is a church or religious institution." 3 ° Therefore,
under the current Supreme Court analysis, the city's code does not violate
the church's free exercise rights since "'a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice."23 Because the Eleventh Circuit had previously
developed and used the Grosz test,232 the Daytona court next analyzed
the constitutional challenge using the Grosz three-part test which consists
of the following requirements: "(1) the government regulation must
regulate religious conduct, not belief; (2) the law must have a secular
purpose and secular effect; and (3) once these threshold tests are met, the
court balances the competing governmental and religious interests. ' ' 3
225 Id. at 1556.
226 Id. See also supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
227 721 F.2d 729 (1 lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S 827 (1984).
228 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1558 (applying both the Supreme Court's
analysis and the Grosz three-part test because the Eleventh Circuit did so in its
opinion in First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, modified, 27
F.3d 526 (1lth Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995)); see supra
note 162 and accompanying text.
229 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1557-58 (citing First Assembly of God v.
Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423, modified, 27 F.3d 526 (1lth Cir. 1994), and
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995) (referring to the Lukumi decision to analyze
laws challenged under the Free Exercise Clause)).
230 Id. at 1558.
"' Id. (quoting First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 424).
232 Id.
233 Id. (citing First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 424).
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Under the first part of the Grosz test, the Daytona court found that
the city code regulated conduct, not religious belief because the zoning
ordinance "regulated housing the homeless on church property and not
the belief in doing so.""24 Arguably, this analysis could just as easily be
employed to regulate worship services, considering that such regulation
only affects the conduct of the church members, not their belief in the
religious importance of worshipping. As to the second part of the Grosz
test, the court found that "the code has a secular purpose and effect"
because there was no evidence that the code was intended to burden
religion or "that it negatively influence[d] the pursuit of religious activity
or expression of religious belief."235 In this part of the analysis, the
Daytona court failed to address why the church's mission of providing
for the needy is either not a religious activity or expression of religious
belief and if it is, how it has not been negatively impacted by the city's
refusal to allow such religious activity on church property.236 The court
later discussed the church's assertion that because feeding the homeless
is "central to their faith," this factor distinguished the case from the First
Assembly decision, where the court found that the church "had not
indicated the significance of the practice of housing the homeless to their
religion ... ,' The Daytona court responded to this assertion by
stating that the Eleventh Circuit found against the church "without
deciding that sheltering the homeless was central to plaintiffs' reli-
gion."" 8 The court's response here is again weak because it does not
attempt to explain why prohibiting the feeding of the homeless does not
"negatively influence" the pursuit of the church's mission and religious
tenets of their members' faith.
Finding that the code passed the Grosz threshold tests, the Daytona
court then used the third part of the Grosz test to balance the burden
placed on the city by not enforcing its zoning code against the burden on
the church's religious interests to comply with the court.239 Here, the
court determined that the balance weighed in favor of the city because:
(1) the preservation of a government's ability to regulate zoning is a
24 Id. at 1558 (citing First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 775 F. Supp.
383, 386 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
235 Id.
2 36 id.
7 Id. at 1559.
28 Id.
" Id. at 1558. As discussed supra notes 157-63, the balancingportion of the
Grosz test appears to convert the Sherbert compelling interest test into a
balancing exercise using religious burden and state interests.
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significant interest24° and (2) the "imposition of a religious based
exception would prevent enforcement of the zoning code and permit any
non-conforming use of property if a religious interest was asserted." '241
Although the church argued that serving the needy was a mission central
to its religious beliefs, the court determined that the burden on religion
was "at the lower end of the spectrum" since "other facilities exist within
the City which house the homeless" and the church did not adequately
explore alternative sites.242 It is not difficult to see weaknesses in this
analysis since churches or their activities could always be restricted by
arguing that "other facilities exist within the City" for activities such as
worship or religious education. The Daytona court gave no weight to
factors such as the fact that religious freedom is a constitutionally
protected right or the fact that religious uses often contribute to the public
welfare.243 The court instead hinted at concerns about safety and
security, but did not consider how these issues might be adequately
addressed by the church if it were permitted to operate its programs for
the homeless.2'
The Daytona court also analyzed the church's constitutional claim
under RFRA's restoration of the compelling interest test.24 5 First, the
court found that the city code did not "substantially burden" the church's
exercise of religion because the church was not prevented from running
a homeless shelter in other parts of Daytona Beach and the church had
only pursued two sites at which to locate its facility.24 6 Second, even
240 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1558 (citing First Assembly of God v. Collier
County, 775 F. Supp. 383, 386 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1559.
243 ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 12.21, at 538 ("[Religious] uses are favored
for reasons ranging from their unique contribution to the public welfare to
constitutional guaranties of freedom of worship.").
244 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1559. See Western Presbyterian Church v.
Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed,
Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL 118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995); see also
infra notes 277-314 and accompanying text (discussing how nuisance law can be
used to address these types of concerns).
245 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1559.
246 Id. at 1560. Section 2000bb-1 of the RFRA provides that "Government
shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section." Subsection (b) provides for an exception as follows:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -
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assuming the court found a substantial burden on the church's free
exercise of religion, the city successfully argued that "enacting and
enforcing fair and reasonable regulations throughout its jurisdiction is a
compelling interest and that regulating a homeless shelter providing daily
shelter and feeding furthers zoning interests."247 This decision is a
prime example of how courts can make RFRA ineffective by "watering
down the compelling interest test."24 If the compelling interest test is
satisfied when an ordinance is fair and reasonable and furthers zoning
interests, then any land use regulation that passes a rational basis standard
will not violate the Free Exercise Clause - no matter what its impact on
religion. The Daytona court also stated that the least restrictive means
was used by the city to further its zoning interests because the code
"requires a church or religious institution to meet the applicable zoning
requirements in the same manner as any other person or entity seeking to
establish a homeless shelter or food bank."2 49 It seems that under this
court's reasoning, the least restrictive means test can be satisfied by any
regulation that is "neutral" and of "general applicability" - which just
takes one back to the Smith rule.25 Certainly, the future success of
RFRA will depend on how the compelling interest test is applied by the
courts. If it is applied in the same way the Daytona court applied it in
this case, then "when [courts] want to uphold something, compelling
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) & (b) (1994).
247 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1560.
248 Laycock, FreeExercise and the RFRA, supra note 136, at 901 (explaining
that the principal danger to RFRA is watering down the compelling state interest
test since "[t]here is no government bureaucrat in America who doesn't believe
that his program serves a compelling interest in every application"). Even prior
to the Smith decision, some courts appeared to apply a "watered-down"
compelling interest test. See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok, Inc. v. Town of
Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("'[W]hen in conflict with
legitimate zoning concerns as public safety, health and welfare, the [F]irst
[A]mendment guarantee of religious expression cannot be viewed as absolute."'
(quoting Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Town of New Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212, 1216
(S.D.N.Y. 1979))).
249 Daytona, 885 F. Supp. at 1560.
250 Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion." 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
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doesn't mean what it says, and lots of interests [will be] important
enough."
251
The third recent homeless decision, First Assembly of God of Naples
v. Collier County,5 2 did not apply RFRA to the church's free exercise
challenge since RFRA was not raised by either party. 3 Instead, the
court applied the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause analysis, as well
as its own constitutional test as pronounced in the Grosz case,2 54 and
found that the county's zoning ordinances did not violate the church's
rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 5 In First Assembly of God, the
church converted a day-care center on its property into a homeless
shelter.25 6 The local community objected to this use of the property
because of concerns over health and safety. As a result, the church's
homeless shelter was found to be in violation of several zoning ordinanc-
es.257 Under the current Supreme Court analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that enforcement of these zoning ordinances did not violate
the church's free exercise rights because the "ordinances [were] neutral
and of general applicability., 258 The court found that the "intent of the
ordinance was not to inhibit or oppress any religion; rather, the Commis-
sion was motivated to address a general problem of health and safety
concerns. The fact that First Assembly was affected was incidental."' 59
It is interesting to note that the ordinance at issue, which defined a
homeless shelter as a group home and restricted permissible locations to
certain zones, was enacted after the "opening of the shelter, amid much
consternation over the problem of the homeless in the Naples communi-
ty.,,260 This circumstance indicates that the county did intend to affect
the church's right to operate a homeless shelter; however, the Eleventh
251 Laycock, Free Exercise and the RFRA, supra note 136, at 902 (discussing
how the Supreme Court has applied the compelling interest test).
252 20 F.3d 419, modified, 27 F.3d 526 (1lth Cir. 1994), and cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 730 (1995).
253 Id. at 424 n.5.
254 Id. at 423-24 (applying the Grosz test because it aids analysis since the
Grosz case was so closely analogous).
255 Id. at 424.
256 Id. at 420.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 423 (noting that this case is distinguishable from the Lukumi case,
where the ordinances at issue "explicitly targeted the religious conduct of animal
sacrifice").
259 id.
260 Id.
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Circuit found that the county's motivation was based on secular concerns
regarding the operation of group homes.261
The Eleventh Circuit in First Assembly of God claimed to apply the
three-part test it adopted in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Florida
2 6
1
to find that "First Assembly's right to free exercise of religion is not
violated by the County's zoning ordinances.,1 6' The first two parts of
this test require that: (1) "the government regulation must regulate
religious conduct, not belief;" and (2) "the law must have a secular
purpose and a secular effect."2' The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Grosz case was "closely analogous" to this case and, therefore, it did not
even bother to analyze the facts of the case before it, concluding only that
"[i]n Grosz, as in the instant case, the two thresholds are easily met.
265
Although the Grosz case involved a conflict between religious worship
and zoning regulations, the facts differ significantly from the facts in
First Assembly of God. In Grosz, a Jewish rabbi began conducting
orthodox worship services in his remodeled garage located in a residential
area and was found to be in violation of a Miami Beach zoning ordinance
which prohibited "churches, synagogues and similarly organized religious
congregations in single-family residential zones. 266 This prohibition
against religious uses had already been "upheld by the State and Federal
trial and appellate courts. 2 67 In First Assembly of God, however, the
church was already established in a residential district which permitted
churches and "their customary accessory uses."268 The homeless shelter
was closed based on the Code Enforcement Board's decision that "the
shelter was not a 'customary accessory use' of the church and that the
applicable housing and zoning codes did not permit the shelter space to
261 Id. ("These regulations apply to all group homes, once again regardless
of their ownership or affiliation, and were motivated by wholly secular
concerns.").
262 721 F.2d 729 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
263 First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 424, modified, 27
F.3d 526 (1 1th Cir. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995). Other courts,
prior to the enactment of RFRA, have applied the Eleventh Circuit's Grosz test
to resolve Free Exercise claims resulting from the enforcement of zoning laws.
See supra note 162.
264 First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 424 (citing Grosz v. City of Miami
Beach, Florida, 721 F.2d 729, 733 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827
(1984)).
265 Id.
266 Grosz, 721 F.2d at 731.
267 id.
268 First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 420.
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
be used as a residence for such a large number of people."269 Because
the Grosz facts involved prohibition of all religious uses in a residential
area while the First Assembly of God facts involved a decision that the
homeless shelter was not an accessory use, the First Assembly of God
facts deserved at least some analysis separate from the analysis performed
over 10 years earlier in Grosz.
In performing the third part of the Grosz test, which balances the
governmental and religious interests, the court again referred to the
analysis in the Grosz case and again concluded, without analysis of the
facts before it, that "[t]he burden on First Assembly to either conform its
shelter to the zoning laws, or to move the shelter to an appropriately
zoned area, is less than the burden on the County were it to be forced to
allow the violation. '270 In light of the Eleventh Circuit's eagerness to
uphold zoning regulations against free exercise challenges, whether
intentional 271 or incidental,272 future free exercise claims under RFRA
may receive a watered-down compelling state interest test as was applied
in Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach.273
Looking at these three recent land use cases, which address the issue
of religious ministering to the homeless, it is evident that in some
jurisdictions religious freedom will remain subject to restrictions by local
zoning regulations regardless of the enactment of RFRA. Courts have the
ability to uphold land use restrictions on religious conduct by narrowly
interpreting what constitutes a "substantial burden" and by broadly
interpreting what qualifies as a "compelling state interest."'274 The
approach taken by the court in Western Presbyterian Church is the most
protective of religious freedom, in that it finds a "substantial burden"
whenever zoning authorities regulate what religious functions a church
269 Id.
270 Id. at 424 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741).
271 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.
Ct. 2217, 2230 (1993) (reversing the Eleventh Circuit's decision based on a
finding that the "ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion").
272 See Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2232; First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 423;
Grosz, 721 F.2d at 729.
273 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995). See supra notes 245-51 and
accompanying text.
274 See Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538, 546 (D.D.C. 1994) ("If circumstances change and the feeding
program becomes a nuisance, upon a proper showing this Court will appropriate-
ly modify its final order."), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL
118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
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may conduct. 275 The court explains that any conflicts with the govem-
ment's interests in providing for the public health, safety, and welfare can
adequately be resolved under nuisance law.
In conclusion, then, in order to preserve religious freedom in the face
of zoning regulations of general applicability, courts must apply RFRA
with a recognition that any zoning restriction on religious conduct must
be justified by a compelling state interest that is much more than just a
desire to give deference to the government's police power. Although
minimum health and safety regulations should be enforceable against
276religious uses, nuisance law rather than restrictive zoning regulation
should be used (as it was prior to the advent of zoning) to control and
remedy any detrimental effects a religious use may have on the surround-
ing community.
Ill. THE ROLE OF NuIsANcE LAW
Prior to the acceptance of zoning in this country as a constitutional
and effective land use control method, 77 communities controlled the
quality of life in their neighborhoods by using nuisance litigation.
7 8
Land use nuisance cases reflected the adage that a landowner may use his
land as he pleases so long as he does not unreasonably interfere with the
use of land by others.2 79 However, with the advent of zoning as a
proactive means of land use control, rather than the reactive nuisance
litigation approach, nuisance actions have become less important as a way
to resolve land use disputes.280 Local governments have overwhelming-
ly opted for the use of zoning ordinances to regulate land uses such that
incompatible uses are segregated and land use conflicts are minimized in
advance.28'
Because zoning regulations are proactive in nature, ordinances which
are found to restrict a religious use can be challenged as an unconstitu-
275 See id. ("Zoning boards have no role to play in telling a religious
organization how it may practice its religion.").
276 See supra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
277 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding an
ordinance restricting uses of land not facially unconstitutional).
27 See MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 4.01, at 94 (explaining that courts
resolved land use disputes through nuisance cases which provided a model for
zoning legislation).
279 Id. § 4.02, at 94.
280 Id. § 4.02, at 95-96.
281 Id. (stating that "most municipalities have adopted zoning ordinances").
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tional prior restraint on the free exercise of religion.28 The majority of
cases involving challenges to zoning ordinances based upon the theory of
prior restraint appear to be First Amendment freedom of speech cases
involving regulation of adult bookstores and theaters.283 However,
zoning restrictions on religious uses have also been challenged as prior
restraints on religious freedom.284 For example, in Nichols v. Planning
282 See, e.g., Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel, No. 30-69-94,
1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2131, at *2 (July 16, 1992) (pointing out that the
"plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment that the provision in the Bethel
Zoning Regulations requiring a special permit to construct a church in residential
and other zones of the Town was in violation of both the U.S. and Connecticut
Constitutions as: (1) a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion"), aff'd, 622
A.2d 591 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 383 (1993).
283 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976)
(arguing that zoning ordinances will not have "a significant deterrent effect on
the exhibition of films protected by the First Amendment"); 11126 Baltimore
Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d 988, 994 (4th Cir.)
(concluding that "adult bookstore ordinance bears a close enough relationship to,
and engenders a sufficient risk of suppression of, protected expression to permit
Warwick Books to bring a facial challenge to the ordinance"), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 567 (1995); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220,
226 (6th Cir.) (holding that ordinance regulating sexually oriented business
withstands constitutional scrutiny), cert. denied, No. 95-203, 1995 WL 472074
(U.S. Oct. 2, 1995); Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 264 (9th Cir.
1994) (involving a zoning ordinance regulating adult bookstores which was
challenged as a standardless prior restraint); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,
682 F.2d 1203, 1220 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that zoning ordinance unconstitu-
tionally restricts adult theaters); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski,
631 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that an ordinance providing for
revocation or suspension of movie theater's license upon finding of obscenity is
an unconstitutional prior restraint), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). Anticipato-
ry nuisance actions could also be viewed as prior restraint; however, courts are
hesitant to grant injunctions against anticipatory nuisances and will not do so
unless "the plaintiff can show with certainty that the use will be a nuisance in the
area in which it plans to locate." MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 4.03, at 102.
284 Nichols v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 667 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Conn.
1987) (holding that a zoning regulation which gives discretionary power to
administrative official to control in advance free exercise of religion is invalid
as a prior restraint); Minney v. City of Azusa, 330 P.2d 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App.
1958) (holding that a zoning ordinance requiring variance for construction of a
church does "not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise
of religion"); Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel, No. 30-69-94, 1992
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2131, at *2 (July 16, 1992) (requesting a declaratory
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& Zoning Commission,285 a resident in the Town of Stratford, Connecti-
cut, was informed by the Town Zoning Enforcement Officer that he was
in violation of a town ordinance because he conducted regular religious
meetings in his home each week.28 6 The regulations, applicable to
single-family residential districts, required special approval for "[a]
church, parish hall, or other religious use.' '287 The court determined that
the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "other
religious use" does not have "the certainty necessary to forewarn the
plaintiffs here that a small group of like-minded individuals, followers of
The Way, may not meet in Nichols' home to interact as their religion
may dictate."288 In addition to not giving citizens adequate warning of
what type of activity is prohibited, the court found that the regulation was
impermissibly subject to arbitrary and discriminatory application by
zoning officials. 2 9 Finally, the court observed that a regulation "'which
gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance
the right of citizens to' exercise constitutionally protected activities -
specifically the free exercise of religion and the right to freely associate
with others" is invalid as a prior restraint on such freedoms.290 The
court concluded that "[t]o allow the Zoning Board or the Zoning
Enforcement Officer indiscriminatly [sic] to continue to declare one's use
of his home as an 'other religious use' and thereby prohibit that use...
would plant the seed for 'covert forms of discrimination,' and provide the
means by which the Town of Stratford could 'suppress[ ] a particular
point of view.' ,
291
This Article proposes that instead of using public zoning regulation
to control in advance land use concerns generated by religious uses,
nuisance law should be employed to resolve conflicts that arise when a
religious use actually creates such a land use problem.292 Nuisance
judgment that zoning regulations requiring a special permit to build a church in
residential zone was a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion).
285 667 F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1987).
286 Id. at 75.
287 Id. (citing Town of Stratford Zoning Regulations §§ 4.1.6 & 4.1.6.3).
288 Id. at 77 ("'[O]ther religious use' does not provide for the citizen of
ordinary intelligence a clear standard by which to regulate his activities.").
289 Id. at 78 (finding that regulations did not sufficiently articulate the
standard for enforcement).
290 Id. (quoting Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)).
291 Id. (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
292 The use of nuisance law as an exception to public land use regulation has
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concepts have indeed been used in some cases to address land use
conflicts created by the influx of individuals outside the immediate
community as a result of religious activities that minister to the
needy.293 Most recently, the court in Western Presbyterian Church v.
Board of Zoning Adjustment2 14 issued a permanent injunction to allow
the church to operate a feeding program for the homeless in a residential
neighborhood, but noted that it would change its order "[i]f circumstances
change and the feeding program becomes a nuisance."295 This reference
to nuisance law was the court's way of ensuring that the community's
concerns about crime and safety were recognized.296 In Wilkinson v.
already been established by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992), where the Court held that a per
se taking of property by government regulation that deprives the landowner of
all economically viable use could only be justified by reference to the state's
common law principles of nuisance.
293 Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-7189, 1995 WL
118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995); Wilkinson v. LaFranz, 574 So. 2d 403 (La. Ct.
App. 1991); Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal
Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Slevin v. Long Island Jewish
Med. Ctr., 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). Nuisance law has also been
used to resolve other land use conflicts involving religious interests. See, e.g.,
Cochise County v. Broken Arrow Baptist Church, 778 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that church building and its use for "printing, collating,
binding and dissemination of printed materials" are a nuisance as a matter of law
when building permit is not obtained prior to construction or use of building);
City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 800-01 (Ct. App. 1981)
(explaining that use of religious family households is not a nuisance per se and
instead requires a factual finding to determine if overcrowded dwelling is a
nuisance); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints v. Ashton, 448 P.2d 185, 192 (Idaho 1968) (holding that use of
church property as a lighted recreation complex does not constitute a nuisance);
Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (holding that use
of building as a religious healing center constitutes a nuisance); Assembly of God
Church v. Bradley, 196 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (explaining that
"church building is not a nuisance per se but its location and the time and
manner of its use may create a nuisance") (citing Waggoner v. Floral Heights
Baptist Church, 288 S.W. 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)).
294 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, Nos. 94-7104, 94-
7189, 1995 WL 118016 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1995).
295 Id. at 546 (pointing out that injunction includes provision that feeding
program is allowed to resume to the extent it does not constitute a nuisance).
296 Id. ("The Church recognizes its responsibility to the community and has
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LaFranz,2 97 the court held that a cause of action could be maintained
against a church's operation of a soup kitchen for violation of the zoning
law and for nuisance.298 The court explained that if the church could
show that it was "authorized to operate a church in this zone and that the
soup kitchen is an integral part" of its activities, the soup kitchen would
be allowed to operate "unless their activities are being carried on in such
a way as to constitute a nuisance." '299
Private and public nuisance actions were also brought against a
church in Greentree at Murray Hill Condominium v. Good Shepherd
Episcopal Church,"' where neighbors argued as well that city zoning
regulations had been violated and that the church was required to file an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") in order to operate a temporary
homeless shelter.3"' The court concluded that the temporary homeless
shelter was a permissible accessory use protected under the church's
current certificate of occupancy3 0 2 and that the project was a "temporary
emergency activity involving the homeless crisis in this city and, as such,
[was] exempt from the preparation of an EIS."3 3 Both nuisance actions
were dismissed because the allegations were legally insufficient.3°4 The
private nuisance action, at a minimum, did not allege that the interference
with the right of use and enjoyment of the neighbors' property was
substantial in nature or that the church's actions were unreasonable. °5 0
The public nuisance action, in turn, was not brought by a public official
and failed to allege "that the emergency temporary homeless shelter
program offends, interferes with or causes damage to the generalpublic
at large in the exercise of rights common to all, nor that it offends public
morals or interferes with the use by the public of a public place or
endangers or injures the property, health, safety or comfort of a consider-
able number of persons."3 6
represented that it will take all reasonable steps to assure the program will not
result in harm to its congregation and neighbors.").
297 574 So. 2d 403 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
298 Id. at 407.
299 Id.
300 550 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
301 Id. at 984.
302 Id. at 986.
303 Id. at 987.
304 Id. at 987-88.
305 Id. at 988.
306 Id.
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When a New York church attempted to establish a drug center in
Long Island for young people with drug problems, neighbors objected to
the center as a violation of existing zoning and as a public danger." 7
The court held that "the drug center is a religious use of the church
property and a valid extension of the religious institution for zoning
purposes."30 8 Although the issue was not phrased in terms of nuisance,
the court addressed the neighbors' argument that the location of the drug
center, even assuming it is a "valid religious usage in discharge of a
legitimate public objective," presents a danger to the community."' The
court agreed that "[w]here the religious use may be so fraught with
danger or peril to the community because of the particular use sought, the
detriment to the community can outweigh the religious consider-
ation."3 0 However, the court observed that the church and the hospital
had taken security measures such as close supervision and regular police
survey in order to address certain dangers to the community." Never-
theless, the court recognized that the facts were not clear as to the impact
on the community and that factual issues such as "statistics and expert
testimony with respect to real and potential expansion of crime and drug
use in the immediate vicinity" would need to be addressed by the trial
court.
312
RFRA 313 requires that government not substantially burden the free
exercise of religion unless it shows that the action "(1) is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."314 Using
nuisance law as a remedy for land use problems that result from religious
uses of property in residential areas appears to be a less restrictive means
of controlling land use than using zoning regulations to control uses in
advance of actual problems such as traffic congestion, lowering of
307 Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1971) (involving the Christ Episcopal Church Parish House in
Manhasset which conducted a drug abuse program by arrangement with Long
Island Jewish Hospital).
30' Id. at 946.
309 Id. at 947.
310.1d.
311 Id. at 948 (explaining that other measures included attendance scrutiny,
geographic restrictions, urine testing, and meals at the center).
312 Id. at 948-49 (explaining that denial of summary judgment returns matter
to trail court for determinations of fact).
313 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1989-94).
314 Id. §§ 2000bb-l(b)(1) & (2) (emphasis added).
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property values, or increased crime in the neighborhood. Therefore,
RFRA may require government officials, who find it necessary to restrict
religious land uses for compelling interests such as the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens, to use nuisance litigation rather than zoning regulation
to control actual land use problems, not just anticipated problems.
CONCLUSION
Religious groups that reach outside their immediate communities to
address social problems, such as homelessness, as part of their religious
mission should be encouraged in their efforts by limiting the degree to
which zoning regulations are applied to their activities." 5 These groups
are trying to fill the void left by the lack of local, state, and federal
funding to care for those in need.316 Rather than discouraging religious
groups from filling this void with private funds, government should
support these activities by honoring what is already an established
constitutional principle - freedom of religion. Land use conflicts
characterized by community opposition and excessive regulation of
religious uses should be resolved by giving deference to the free exercise
... Abigail McCarthy, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Churches Disturb
the Peace, COMMONWEALTH FOUND., Oct. 22, 1993, at 9 (Although charity has
always been at the heart of religion, the "virtue behind the current [land use]
controversy is the acknowledgment by the contemporary church member that he
or she is personally responsible for doing good unto others, especially those in
most need. It is also the acknowledgment of the church and the local congrega-
tion that its responsibility to the community is as great as its responsibility to its
members.").
316 Dan Luzadder, Ordinance Cuts Aid to Homeless; Religious Leaders Say
They're Caught Between "Spiritual Duty" and Government Regulation, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEws (Colorado), Oct. 4, 1994, at A4 (quoting minister who says
that "'housing of the homeless has always fallen to the churches .... [t]here
are no shelters in Denver... that aren't sponsored and funded by religious
bodies."'); Robert E. Pierre, From Pulpit to Planning Board; Churches and
Synagogues Become Developers to Fill the Housing Void, WASH. POST, Apr. 28,
1994, at BI (reporting that church projects "are trying to compensate for the
minuscule amount of low-income housing being built by government and private
industry, as well as increasing poverty and the loss of housing to decay and
demolition"); Laurie Goodstein, D.C. Clerics Issue Call to Action Over Zoning,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1994, at B1, B5 (reporting that "some ministers criticized
[the Mayor] and the D.C. Council for depending on the religious community to
fill the void left by cuts in government services, then disappearing when churches
face opposition").
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of religion protected under the First Amendment. Zoning regulations
applied to religious uses should be limited to those minimum restrictions
necessary to address important health and safety concerns such as fire
safety standards, but not traffic congestion or parking limitations."a7
Since regulating religious uses through zoning in anticipation of potential
problems may act as an invalid prior restraint on religious freedom,
nuisance litigation - not zoning regulation - should be used to determine
a remedy when religious land uses actually do interfere with the use and
enjoyment of the neighboring property. In addition, RFRA demands that
whenever a compelling government interest requires that religion be
substantially burdened, such an action must be accomplished in the least
restrictive manner.
Religious land uses should be restricted only when they interfere with
another's use and enjoyment and the benefit of the religious use is
outweighed by the burden on the other landowners' use of their property.
Nuisance litigation, not zoning regulation, is the least restrictive means
of furthering compelling governmental interests that substantially burden
the religious exercise of ministering to those in need.
317 Gahr, supra note 120, at 15 (explaining that RFRA "will limit the use of
zoning codes only to health and safety concerns").
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